The Probability of Miracles

 

Some time ago, I put together a discussion of the probability of miracles in response to a conversation I was having with a skeptic.  Below is what I put together as a response to the questions he raised.

The Probability of Miracles

 Returning briefly to the issue of miracles, let me just repeat what I said before regarding your seeming faith commitment to Metaphysical Naturalism.  If you make the decision a priori that miracles are not possible because they violate the laws of physics, then it seems that you’re simply stating one of your presuppositions rather than describing the results of an investigation in which you’ve reached some conclusion.

Further, though you talk about the extreme unlikelihood of a miracle occurring (Thomas Paine’s statement about the likelihood of someone lying vs. the likelihood of the dead raising to life), this may not always be the case.  When considering whether we can believe in miracles, there are at least two things we need to consider:

•        Are miracles even possible?
•        Is it ever reasonable to believe in miracles?

Are miracles even possible?

It seems that the objection to miracles often relies on the idea that such things are simply impossible.  Spinoza attempted to take this position when he identified miracles as a violation of the laws of nature.  He then asserted that it was impossible for something to violate the laws of nature, thus rendering miracles impossible.  Another way to state this is as follows:

•        Miracles are violations of natural law
•        It is impossible to violate natural laws
•        Therefore, miracles are impossible

 Immediately, we see a problem.  Spinoza has set his argument up in a way that is clearly “begging the question”.  If he presumes that natural laws cannot be violated and then he asserts that miracles are violations of natural laws, OF COURSE miracles are impossible.  The problem is, however, that Spinoza has not shown either that natural laws cannot be violated OR that miracles are violations of natural laws.

 One of Spinoza’s beliefs is that there can only be one infinite substance.  He believed that the universe was infinite and due to this, God couldn’t have created the universe (since God would have to be one infinite substance and the universe another).  Thus, in Spinoza’s view God simply was nature.  This led him to the conclusion that miracles could not violate nature because this would be the same thing as saying “miracles violate God”.

 Today, we have very good evidence that the universe is not infinite as Spinoza thought.  Instead, it came into existence out of nothing in the Big Bang.  Indeed, cosmologists conclude that matter, space and time itself came into existence at the Big Bang.  Thus, we cannot conclude that God and nature are one.  This undermines Spinoza’s argument that it’s impossible for there to be any violation (though ‘suspension’ is a better term) of the laws of nature on the basis that God and nature are the same.

 If the laws of nature were created, then it’s reasonable to assume that the creator of the laws could also suspend those laws if it met His purposes.  Thus, it’s reasonable to conclude that miracles are not impossibilities.

 Is it ever reasonable to believe in miracles?

 Even once we deal with the issue of miracles being impossible, we still are left with the additional question of whether it’s reasonable to believe in a miracle in any given situation.  To this question, David Hume has directed his critique.  In his essay “On Miracles”, he concludes that, while miracles may happen, we are never justified in believing them since a miracle is, by definition, the least likely thing.  Here is how Hume crafts his argument:

•        A miracle is a rare occurrence
•       Natural law is a regular occurrence
•       The evidence for regular occurrences is always greater than for rare occurrences
•       People should base their beliefs on that which has the greater evidence
•        Thus, people should never believe in miracles

 

On the surface, this looks like an excellent argument (and, indeed, many atheists still hold to it today).  There are problems with it, however.

 First, depending on Hume’s intent, his argument engages in either “begging the question” or “special pleading”.  Norman Geisler addresses this in his ‘Miracles and the Modern Mind’.  On page 28 he says:

 Hume speaks of “uniform” experience in his argument against miracles, but this either begs the question or else is special pleading.  It begs the question if Hume presumes to know the experience is uniform in advance of looking at the evidence.  For how can we know that all possible experience will confirm naturalism, unless we have access to all possible experiences, including those in the future?  If, on the other hand, Hume simply means by “uniform” experience the select experiences of some persons (who have not encountered a miracle), then this is special pleading.

 And beyond these problems, there is the fact that Hume is essentially saying “go with the odds”.  Regardless of how good the evidence is for a miracle, one should never believe it because there is more evidence for the non-miraculous.  In other words, if you have excellent evidence for the resurrection (even seeing Jesus raised from the dead, for instance) you shouldn’t believe it because the number of times when people died and weren’t raised from the dead is far more frequent, so you should go with that evidence and disbelieve the resurrection you have personally witnessed.  But on these grounds, we should refuse to believe that we have the winning lottery ticket on the grounds that it’s MUCH more likely that we don’t have the winning ticket.

 In fact, imagine the following…after being hospitalized after a grave automobile accident, you die.  You are aware that you’re dead for several days and then become aware that you’ve been resurrected through supernatural means.  Your wounds are likewise all healed.  According to Hume, you should disbelieve in your own resurrection on the basis that more people DON’T raise from the dead and thus you can’t trust your own personal knowledge of your own resurrection.  How much more absurd can we get than that?

 In fact, Hume’s argument is such a bad one that it led John Earman to write an excellent book critiquing it.  The book is called “Hume’s Abject Failure” and it addresses Hume’s argument using Probability Theory which is definitely worth a look.

 So what do we see?  We’ve learned two things:

• It cannot be said that miracles are impossible
• 2.     It can be shown that, given compelling evidence, one can reasonably believe that a miracle has occurred

 In other words, both Spinoza and Hume fail to defeat the possibility or believability of miracles.

 Before moving on, I do want to reference Bayes’ Theorem and offer some links that explain how this can be used to demonstrate that, given the right conditions, miracles may be very likely.  Here are a couple of references that should help explain things a bit better than I am able:

 

1. Can a rational person believe in miracles?
2. Dale Allison on the Resurrection of Jesus

 

As I say, I don’t want to get into a deep discussion of Bayes’ Theorem, but I did want to offer these links as further evidence that the belief in miracles shouldn’t be ruled out a priori.

 One final article that gives a good general defense of the possibility of miracles is Miracles by Mark Pickering and Peter Saunders.  I highly recommend that you take a look.

 Additionally, let me offer references to two other very good books on the topic of Miracles.  These are:

 

1. Miracles by C.S. Lewis
2. In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Actions in History by Doug Geivett and Gary Habermas (editors)
3. Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts by Craig Keener